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| China’s dominance in rare earth elements gives it powerful leverage in the growing U.S.–China trade conflict.(Representing AI image) |
Threatening High Tariffs Is Not the Answer: Unpacking China’s Rejection of U.S. Sanctions and the Risks of Escalation
Table of Contents
- Introduction: A Flashpoint in U.S.-China Relations
- The Latest Confrontation: What China Is Saying
- Tariffs as a Policy Tool: Theory and Reality
- 3.1 The mechanics of tariffs
- 3.2 Past U.S.–China tariff wars: a retrospective
- Rare Earths as Strategic Leverage
- 4.1 China’s dominance in rare earth supply
- 4.2 Implications for U.S. defense and tech industries
- Economic Fallout and Global Ripple Effects
- 5.1 Impact on bilateral trade and supply chains
- 5.2 Effects on U.S. agriculture, manufacturing, and consumers
- 5.3 Responses from third-party economies
- China’s Possible Countermeasures: Options & Constraints
- 6.1 Tariff retaliation, export controls, and regulatory tools
- 6.2 Legal recourse: WTO and dispute settlement
- 6.3 Strategic signaling and soft power moves
- Risks of a Full-Blown Trade War
- 7.1 Escalation spirals and “tit-for-tat” traps
- 7.2 Global economic slowdown and inflation pressures
- 7.3 Geopolitical spillovers
- Paths Toward De-escalation and Cooperation
- 8.1 Diplomatic frameworks and negotiation windows
- 8.2 Diversification of supply chains and resilience strategies
- 8.3 Multilateral trade rules as stabilizers
- My Take: Why China Has a Point
- Conclusion: Lessons & the Road Ahead
- FAQs
- Sources
1. Introduction: A Flashpoint in U.S.-China Relations
In October 2025, China issued a potent diplomatic rebuke to the United States: “Threatening high tariffs is not the right way to deal with China.” That message came amid a dramatic escalation in trade tensions — with the U.S. threatening 100 percent tariffs on Chinese imports and China warning of countermeasures.
This public confrontation is not just diplomatic theater; it touches on the heart of how major powers wield economic coercion in a globally interconnected world. In one corner is the U.S., wielding tariffs, export controls, and sanctions as levers of pressure. In the other, China is armed with market dominance in strategic materials, regulatory tools, and shifting alliances.
In this detailed analysis, we will unpack why China’s objections are more than rhetoric, what the economic stakes are, and how both sides might still step back from the brink.
2. The Latest Confrontation: What China Is Saying
In response to U.S. threats of steep tariffs, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian stated that China “firmly rejects recent restrictions and sanctions” and will take necessary actions to protect its legitimate rights and interests. He urged the U.S. to change course and rely on dialogue.
China’s commerce ministry echoed this, cautioning that “resorting to threats of high tariffs is not the right way to engage.” If the U.S. persists, Beijing warned, it will “resolutely take corresponding measures.”
In prior rounds, China has already levied retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods and placed U.S. firms on “unreliable entities” lists, restricting their ability to trade in or with China.
China also signals legal and diplomatic pushback, including possible recourse to the WTO, accusing the U.S. of violating trade norms.
That said, Beijing often prefers ambiguity: Chinese statements have sometimes left countermeasures unspecified, preserving strategic flexibility.
China’s stance reflects both conviction and caution. It does not want to be seen as weak, but also wants to avoid a catastrophic decoupling.
3. Tariffs as a Policy Tool: Theory and Reality
3.1 The Mechanics of Tariffs
A tariff is a tax imposed by a government on imported goods. In theory, it raises the cost of foreign products, making domestic products more competitive. Tariffs can serve multiple purposes:
- Revenue generation
- Protection of domestic industries
- Leveraged pressure in trade diplomacy
But the effects are rarely clean. Tariffs are often passed through to consumers, disrupt supply chains, invite retaliation, and distort comparative advantage.
3.2 Past U.S.–China Tariff Wars: A Retrospective
Since 2018, U.S.–China trade tensions have included multiple rounds of tariffs. At peak, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods reached ~145%, while China’s duties on U.S. goods peaked near 120%.
The Phase One trade deal (2020) eased some tariffs but did not resolve underlying structural tensions. Since then, efforts to targeting technology, intellectual property, and supply chains have deepened.
Economists generally assess that the earlier tariff war led to global disruptions without achieving systemic rebalancing. Many U.S. companies off‑shored supply chains or accepted higher costs; consumers absorbed price inflation; and global trade shifted patterns.
Thus, the current confrontation is not new, but it is higher-stakes and more technologically entrenched than before.
4. Rare Earths as Strategic Leverage
4.1 China’s Dominance in Rare Earth Supply
China mines roughly 70% of the world’s rare earth elements (REEs) and controls about 90% of REE processing.
In April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven medium-to-heavy REEs (including dysprosium, yttrium, terbium).
The U.S. has been heavily dependent: estimates suggest 70% of U.S. rare earth imports come from China.
By licensing exports and selectively restricting shipments to specific entities (especially in defense or dual-use sectors), China exerts a chokepoint on critical supply chains.
4.2 Implications for U.S. Defense and Tech Industries
Certain rare earths are vital for advanced technologies: permanent magnets in EV motors, jet engines, precision lasers, radar systems, sensors, and more.
Chatham House notes that rare earth restrictions give China strategic leverage in disabling upstream supply for aerospace and defense capacity.
According to a recent network‑analysis study, dependencies on rare earth processing amplify trade risks: the U.S. and EU belong to “vulnerable clusters” in the global REE network, while China dominates a central, low‑risk but high‑influence cluster.
In short: China’s rare earth dominance is not just economic; it underpins strategic asymmetries in the U.S.–China rivalry.
5. Economic Fallout and Global Ripple Effects
5.1 Impact on Bilateral Trade & Supply Chains
In the first six months of the China-U.S. tariff escalation, Chinese exports to the U.S. fell ~27%.
Graphical data underscores how the U.S. trade deficit with China, once over $500 billion, has shrunk ~30% from peak.
Tariff threats and supply shocks amplify uncertainty. As Reuters notes: “uncertainty and inability for consumers and businesses … to plan …” are immediate consequences.
Global supply chains already reoriented post‑COVID may now accelerate diversions to Southeast Asia, India, Mexico, or Latin America. Many companies had begun "China+1" strategies; the current pressures push them harder.
5.2 Effects on U.S. Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Consumers
China’s retaliatory tariffs historically have hit U.S. agricultural goods severely. For instance, in earlier years, China imposed additional 15% tariffs on U.S. soybeans, corn, etc.
A recent econometric analysis assesses the impact: U.S. soybean farmers experienced price drops, export losses, and field reduction in acreage.
Tariffs also elevate costs for intermediate goods. U.S. manufacturers relying on Chinese components may face input price inflation, squeezing margins or forcing consumer price increases.
Consumers ultimately pay via higher costs of electronics, machinery, or consumer goods. Some inflation analyses foresee a 0.3–0.5% bump in U.S. price indices from renewed tariff shocks.
5.3 Responses from Third-Party Economies
Countries in Southeast Asia, India, Vietnam, Mexico, and Eastern Europe have a chance to attract relocated manufacturing. But they also face spillover inflation and supply chain dislocations.
The European Union and others have warned that China’s rare earth controls could paralyze factories within days given dependence on magnets and REE inputs.
Some nations might be pressured to side diplomatically; China has threatened countermeasures against countries seen as too aligned with U.S. trade sanctions.
Thus, the U.S.–China tit‑for‑tat can ripple globally, destabilizing smaller trade alliances and undermining the multilateral trade environment.
6. China’s Possible Countermeasures: Options & Constraints
6.1 Tariff Retaliation, Export Controls & Regulatory Tools
China could raise tariffs further on U.S. goods (e.g. agriculture, energy, machinery) — a standard route.
It can impose export bans or licensing controls on critical materials (rare earths, semiconductors, dual-use goods) to selectively throttle U.S. access.
China can also tighten regulatory measures: delays in approvals, increased standards, customs scrutiny, or use of “unreliable entities” lists to freeze U.S. firms out of Chinese markets.
In the financial realm, currency adjustments, sovereign investment restrictions, or capital controls are possible though risky.
6.2 Legal Recourse: WTO & Dispute Settlement
China could file formal complaints with the World Trade Organization, accusing the U.S. of violating WTO rules through unilateral tariff hikes.
However, WTO procedures are slow, and enforcing rulings against the U.S. can be politically and legally difficult.
6.3 Strategic Signaling & Soft Power Moves
China can engage in diplomatic overtures to U.S. allies, framing U.S. tariffs as a threat to global trade norms. It could deepen trade ties with the EU, ASEAN, Africa, and Belt & Road countries to reduce U.S. leverage.
Also Greece, India, Africa, Latin America become potential export or investment partners to offset U.S. pressures.
By keeping countermeasures calibrated and asymmetric (targeted retaliation rather than blanket tariffs), China can avoid triggering a mutually destructive spiral.
7. Risks of a Full‑Blown Trade War
7.1 Escalation Spirals & “Tit‑for‑Tat” Traps
Once both sides begin escalating, each move prompts a counter. Without credible de-escalation channels, the cycle can quickly spiral into full economic decoupling.
Tariffs are blunt instruments; escalation can spill into non‑tariff barriers, export controls, restrictions on investment, technology bans, and more.
7.2 Global Economic Slowdown & Inflation Pressures
The global economy is already fragile post‑COVID and amid energy transitions. Additional trade friction can depress growth, reduce investment, push commodity prices, and fuel inflation.
If input costs and supply disruptions mount, inflation could intensify, pressuring central banks to tighten—leading to stagflation risks.
7.3 Geopolitical Spillovers
Trade war heightens geopolitical tensions: U.S. allies in East Asia, Europe, or even India might need to pick sides. Security cooperation or alliances could realign.
China might respond with political measures — e.g. maritime assertiveness, military posturing, or influencing third nations. The stakes extend well beyond economics.
8. Paths Toward De-escalation and Cooperation
8.1 Diplomatic Frameworks & Negotiation Windows
Direct summit diplomacy between U.S. and China (e.g. Trump–Xi meeting) remains critical. Back‑channel engagement, confidence-building measures, and phased reduction of tariff threats can open space.
Commitments to frameworks like the G20, APEC, or multilateral trade dialogues could help stabilize expectations.
8.2 Diversification of Supply Chains & Resilience Strategies
For the U.S. and its allies, accelerating efforts to diversify raw material sourcing (Australia, Japan, Africa), expand domestic refining, and recycle critical materials is vital.
Public and private investments in alternative technologies (e.g. rare earth substitutes) and redundancy in supply chains will cushion shocks.
8.3 Multilateral Trade Rules as Stabilizers
Clearer rules via the WTO or revamped trade pacts (e.g. Indo-Pacific agreements, regional trade agreements) might constrain unilateral tariff escalation.
Third‑party mediation—by neutral countries or institutions—can help deconflict without ideological entanglement.
9. My Take: Why China Has a Point
China’s assertion that “threatening high tariffs is not the right way to deal” is more than diplomatic posturing — it reflects a deeper logic:
- Tariffs are coercive tools that sunder trust and destabilize long-term trade order.
- China’s capacity to retaliate is not symmetrical, but strategically potent (via rare earths, regulatory control, and global partnerships).
- A negotiated path — even if imperfect — may yield more durable and stable outcomes than perpetual trade war.
- The U.S. may be underestimating how deeply global supply chains and geoeconomic realities have changed since the last tariff war.
That said, China’s position is not purely defensive: it too aims to reshape the rules of high-tech trade, assert sovereignty over supply chains, and test U.S. boundaries. The question is not whether China is right; it’s whether both sides can manage the contest without wrecking the global economy.
10. Conclusion: Lessons & the Road Ahead
The recent clash over U.S. tariff threats and China’s resistance underscores that economic coercion in an interdependent world is fraught with risk.
Key takeaways:
- Tariffs remain an accessible but blunt tool — effective in short-term pressure but damaging in sustained conflict.
- China’s rare earth dominance elevates the stakes beyond trade: it impacts defense, technology, and strategic balance.
- Countermeasures and escalation cycles can quickly spiral unless carefully managed.
- Third-party nations, supply-chain diversification, and multilateral rules matter more now than ever.
- Ultimately, diplomacy, incremental withdrawal of threats, and creative negotiation may be the only sustainable exit.
The bilateral tensions we see today are a test of how major powers adapt to a new era of trade competition — one where coercion and interdependence coexist uneasily. Watching how the next moves unfold will be critical not only for the U.S. and China, but for the global trading order itself.
11. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Q1: Could China’s countermeasures backfire and hurt itself more?
Yes. Overly aggressive retaliation may chill foreign investment, disrupt Chinese exports, and cause blowback in global perceptions. China must calibrate responses to avoid self-inflicted damage.
Q2: Is the U.S. allowed to unilaterally impose such extreme tariffs under WTO rules?
Under WTO rules, unilateral tariffs must satisfy strict conditions (e.g., safeguard measures, national security exemptions). The U.S. faces legal challenges and counterclaims in dispute settlement. China has already hinted at filing WTO cases.
Q3: Can the U.S. reduce dependence on Chinese rare earths quickly?
It’s difficult. Mining, refining, and building new capacity is time- and capital-intensive. Policies, incentives, and technology innovation can accelerate it, but short-term disruption is inevitable.
Q4: Will global supply chains return to pre‑tension status after resolution?
Probably not fully. Many firms, once diversified, will retain redundancy. The new normal may feature more resilience and multi‑sourcing, even after tension eases.
Q5: What role can middle powers (like India) play in this standoff?
Middle powers can offer alternate trade routes, act as neutral conduits, and encourage multilateral frameworks. For example, India might benefit from diverted investment and act as a balancing mediator.
12. Sources
- Reuters / CNBC: China rejects additional U.S. tariffs, vows countermeasures
- BBC: Why China curbing rare earth exports is a huge blow to the U.S.
- Chatham House: China’s rare earth export restrictions threaten Washington’s military primacy
- CSIS: The Consequences of China’s New Rare Earths Export Restrictions
- Al Jazeera: Why China’s rare earth exports are key in trade tensions
- Hindustan Times: China ‘firmly opposes’ new Trump tariffs
- People’s Daily via People.cn: Beijing vows resolute steps against tariffs
- Economic Times: China rejects tariff blackmail, vows to fight to the end
- ArXiv preprint: Systemic Trade Risk in Rare Earth Industries
- ArXiv preprint: Economic Impact of China’s Retaliatory Soybean Tariff
- Visuals and charts from Reuters/Statista/CapitalGroup

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