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Stalled construction sites in major Chinese cities are becoming the symbol of the country’s deepening real estate crisis in 2025.(Representing AI image)
China’s Property Slump Drags Down Fixed‑Asset Investment — A Deep Dive into the 2025 Crisis
- Dr.Sanjaykumar pawar
Table of Contents
- Introduction: The Unraveling of China’s Growth Engine
- Background: Why Real Estate Mattered So Much
- Understanding Fixed‑Asset Investment (FAI) & Its Components
- The 2025 Numbers: Data, Trends & Alarms
- 4.1 First Eight Months: 0.5% Growth, –12.9% in Property
- 4.2 Dissecting the Subcomponents: Construction, Sales, Starts
- 4.3 Regional & Tier‑City Differences
- Root Causes: What’s Behind the Slump?
- 5.1 Developer Leverage, Liquidity Crunch & Defaults
- 5.2 Regulatory Constraints: “Three Red Lines” etc.
- 5.3 Buyer Sentiment, Demographics & Overhang
- 5.4 Local Government Fiscal Strains & Land Revenues
- 5.5 External Headwinds: Trade, Credit, Global Rates
- Spillovers: Why This Matters Beyond Real Estate
- 6.1 GDP Drag & Growth Rebalancing
- 6.2 Financial Sector Stress & Non‑Performing Loans
- 6.3 Household Wealth, Consumption & Confidence
- 6.4 Commodity Demand, Global Linkages
- 6.5 Local Government and Social Stability Risks
- Policy Responses: What Beijing Has Tried & What’s Next
- 7.1 Monetary, Fiscal & Credit Tools
- 7.2 Direct Support to Developers & Restructuring
- 7.3 Demand Stimulus: Homebuyer Incentives, Subsidies
- 7.4 Structural Reforms: Land, Property Tax, Local Finance
- Scenario Outlook & Risks: What Could Happen Next
- Opinion & Insights: Lessons and Strategic Implications
- Conclusion: Toward Stabilization or Deeper Slump?
- FAQ
- References / Further Reading
1. Introduction: The Unraveling of China’s Growth Engine
For more than four decades, China’s economic miracle was driven by an unstoppable combination of property, construction, and investment. This powerful triad transformed skylines, created millions of jobs, and built immense wealth for local governments and households alike. From gleaming skyscrapers in Shanghai to vast housing complexes across provincial cities, real estate became the cornerstone of China’s rise.
However, by 2025, the once-booming engine of growth has begun to stall. Recent data paints a sobering picture: fixed-asset investment (FAI) — a key indicator of spending on infrastructure, factories, and property — grew by only 0.5% in the first eight months of 2025. Even more alarming, real estate investment plunged 12.9% year-on-year, revealing deep structural weaknesses in the world’s second-largest economy.
This slowdown isn’t just a temporary hiccup. It signals a fundamental shift in China’s economic model, long dependent on debt-fueled development and speculative property demand. Local governments, once flush with land-sale revenues, are now facing budget shortfalls. Developers are struggling with liquidity crises, while households — burdened by falling property values — are reining in spending. The ripple effects extend beyond China’s borders, affecting global commodity markets, trade flows, and investor sentiment.
This blog delves into the data behind China’s faltering investment machine, exploring how years of overbuilding, tightening credit, and demographic shifts have converged into a perfect storm. We analyze the underlying causes, assess the government’s policy responses, and examine the potential global implications of China’s slowdown.
As China’s property-construction-investment nexus unravels, the world stands at a critical juncture — watching how Beijing will navigate one of the most complex economic transitions of the 21st century.
2. Background: Why Real Estate Mattered So Much
To understand China’s current economic struggles in 2025, it’s crucial to first grasp why real estate became such a dominant force in the country’s growth model. For decades, property wasn’t just about housing — it was the lifeblood of China’s economic miracle, powering everything from local government finances to household wealth creation.
A Quarter of the Economy Built on Bricks and Steel
At its peak, the real estate and construction sectors — along with closely linked industries such as steel, cement, home furnishings, and finance — contributed between 25% and 30% of China’s GDP. This massive ecosystem turned construction cranes into a symbol of prosperity. Every apartment built and every bridge erected rippled through the economy, boosting demand for materials, labor, and credit. The result was a self-reinforcing cycle of investment and growth that fueled China’s rapid urbanization.
Local Governments’ Dependence on Land Sales
Another key pillar of this system was the land finance model. Local governments, responsible for much of China’s infrastructure spending, lacked stable tax revenues. Instead, they relied heavily on selling land-use rights to property developers. These transactions became a critical funding source, often making up a large share of local budgets. This dependency created strong incentives to sustain property booms, as slowing sales directly threatened public finances and social projects.
Household Wealth, Savings, and Speculation
For Chinese households, property ownership symbolized security and success. With limited investment options and a volatile stock market, families poured their life savings into real estate. As prices rose, property became the dominant store of wealth, reinforcing speculative demand. By 2025, more than 70% of household assets were tied to housing, leaving families deeply exposed to market downturns.
Employment and Credit Flows
The property sector was also a major employment engine, providing jobs for tens of millions — from construction workers to mortgage brokers. It absorbed vast amounts of credit, with banks and shadow lenders funneling trillions of yuan into development projects. When property weakens, it reverberates through the financial system, tightening liquidity and stalling business confidence.
A Systemic Stress Test in Motion
Because real estate touches nearly every corner of China’s economy, today’s slowdown is more than a housing slump — it’s a systemic stress test. The unraveling of this sector threatens growth, financial stability, and even social trust.
3. Understanding Fixed‑Asset Investment (FAI) & Its Components
To understand the depth of China’s economic slowdown in 2025, it’s essential to unpack one of its most crucial indicators — Fixed-Asset Investment (FAI). This measure reflects how much businesses, governments, and households are spending on physical assets that drive long-term growth. When FAI weakens, it signals not just a cooling property market but a slowdown in the entire growth engine of the economy.
What Is Fixed-Asset Investment (FAI)?
Fixed-Asset Investment refers to spending on tangible, productive assets such as infrastructure projects, machinery, manufacturing plants, and real estate development. In China’s case, this indicator has long been a key driver of GDP growth. FAI captures the money funneled into building highways, expanding factories, and developing housing and office towers — essentially, the backbone of China’s investment-led economy.
Breaking Down the Components: Property vs. Core Sectors
Analysts typically divide FAI into two broad categories: property-related investment and non-property (or core) investment, which includes infrastructure and manufacturing. The property component — residential, commercial, and industrial real estate — once dominated the data, buoyed by years of easy credit and strong demand. But as of 2025, real estate FAI has fallen sharply, down 12.9% year-on-year, dragging the overall figure to near stagnation at just 0.5% growth.
Meanwhile, infrastructure and manufacturing investments — though still expanding modestly — can’t fully offset the property slump. This is why separating property from “core FAI” helps analysts gauge the underlying health of the real economy without the distortions of the housing downturn.
Nominal vs. Real Investment: The Inflation Factor
It’s also vital to distinguish between nominal and real investment. Nominal FAI reflects total spending, while real FAI adjusts for inflation and price changes in materials. With costs fluctuating, nominal stability can mask real declines in activity, obscuring the extent of the slowdown.
Timing, Lags, and Lingering Effects
Property cycles in China unfold over years — from land acquisition to project completion and sales. This means today’s decline in land purchases or developer financing will continue to weigh on investment and employment for several quarters, even if policy support increases.
Ultimately, a deep property sector contraction can overwhelm gains elsewhere, eroding business confidence and curbing credit flows. In China’s 2025 context, understanding FAI’s structure is key to grasping why the slowdown runs deeper than construction sites and cranes.
4. The 2025 Numbers: Data, Trends & Alarms
4.1 First Eight Months: 0.5% Growth, –12.9% in Property
According to recent data, China’s fixed-asset investment (excluding rural households) increased just 0.5 % year-over-year in the first eight months of 2025, marking one of the weakest performances outside of the COVID shock period. Meanwhile, property investment plunged 12.9 % year-on-year in the same period.
(This is widely reported though not always from an official central source; Reuters noted the 0.5% figure in a news item quoting the National Development and Reform Commission)
Other sources corroborate: China’s property investment fell 10.7% year‑on‑year in the first five months.
During Q1 2025, property investment alone dropped 9.9 %.
Thus, the property sector is clearly dragging the aggregate.
4.2 Dissecting the Subcomponents: Construction, Sales, Starts
The depth of the slump becomes more evident when we break it down:
- New construction starts: Floor area initiated by developers dropped sharply—by as much as ~23% in early 2025 compared to a year prior.
- Property sales: Sales in terms of area (square meters) fell ~18.8% in the first eight months.
- Funds raised by developers: Financing (bond issuance, equity) shrank ~16.3% during the same period.
- Residential investment: In the first seven months, residential investment fell 10.9%.
- Land‑sale revenues: A critical lever for developers and local governments, land‑sale revenues have decelerated sharply (often in double digits declines). (Various news commentary)
Statista’s chart shows a roughly –12% year-on-year drop in real estate development investment in the first seven months of 2025.
The IMF’s projection chart (in one scenario) anticipates that housing investment could fall 30–60% below 2022 levels before a gradual rebound.
4.3 Regional & Tier‑City Differences
- Regional splits: The northeastern region (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) saw particularly steep declines (e.g. –22.2% in July) in property investment.
- City tiers: Tier‑1 and Tier‑2 cities saw price declines in new homes in 2025: 1.7% down in Tier‑1, 3.5% drop in Tier‑2, and 4.9% drop in Tier‑3 cities.
These disparities hint at heterogeneity: stronger metro areas with better capital, liquidity, and fundamentals might fare slightly better; lower-tier and less economically robust cities are under greater stress.
5. Root Causes: What’s Behind the Slump?
China’s economic slowdown in 2025 is not the result of a single shock but rather a convergence of interlinked forces. Years of over-leverage, demographic changes, and policy tightening have all come to a head, creating a structural correction rather than a short-term dip. To understand the depth of this downturn, we must unpack several reinforcing strands that explain why China’s once unstoppable growth engine is now sputtering.
5.1 Developer Leverage, Liquidity Crunch & Defaults
During the boom years, many Chinese property developers relied on heavy borrowing to finance aggressive land acquisitions and massive construction projects. Cheap credit and soaring home prices encouraged this cycle of leverage. However, as the market cooled, those same debts turned toxic.
By 2025, several high-profile developers have defaulted or entered restructuring, eroding both investor and buyer confidence. With capital markets tightening, access to new financing has dried up. This liquidity crunch means new projects are delayed or cancelled, while many half-built complexes sit unfinished — a visible reminder of the sector’s excesses.
These unfinished projects also contribute to a mounting inventory overhang, which further suppresses prices and deters new investment. The result is a painful consolidation process where weaker developers shrink or collapse, leaving only a handful of stronger, state-backed players. The transition may lead to a healthier market long term, but in the short term, it drags down growth and employment.
5.2 Regulatory Constraints: “Three Red Lines” & Debt Caps
Introduced in 2020, the “Three Red Lines” policy was designed to curb reckless borrowing by setting strict limits on developers’ debt-to-asset, debt-to-equity, and cash-to-short-term-debt ratios. While this policy aimed to defuse systemic risk, it also cut off credit to developers who were already highly leveraged.
As banks tightened lending and regulators enforced these debt caps, even financially sound developers found it difficult to raise funds for new projects. The unintended consequence has been a credit choke, freezing activity across the sector and deepening the slowdown.
5.3 Buyer Sentiment, Demographics & Overhang
The property market relies heavily on consumer confidence, and that confidence has eroded sharply. Reports of unfinished apartments, price declines, and developer bankruptcies have made many potential buyers hesitant to commit.
Adding to the challenge are demographic shifts. China’s population is aging, and the number of young households — the main source of new housing demand — is shrinking. Slower urbanization and a declining birth rate mean that long-term demand is weakening.
At the same time, many cities are struggling with an oversupply of housing. Empty apartments and unsold inventory must be absorbed before new development becomes viable. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle: low demand and high supply push prices down, further discouraging investment.
5.4 Local Government Fiscal Strains & Land Revenues
Local governments in China have long depended on land sales to finance infrastructure and social projects. As the property market slumps, land prices and transaction volumes have plunged, squeezing local budgets.
This fiscal strain has ripple effects. With reduced revenue, local authorities have less capacity to stimulate growth through public works or subsidies. An academic study on local government debt and banking risk highlights how rising debt servicing costs are now crowding out private credit, putting pressure on local banks and constraining lending to the real economy.
5.5 External Headwinds: Trade, Credit, Global Rates
China’s downturn is also shaped by global forces. Weak international demand, persistent trade tensions, and sluggish global growth have dampened exports — traditionally a key economic driver.
Meanwhile, high global interest rates have increased borrowing costs and reduced foreign capital inflows. For Chinese firms, external financing is now more expensive and risk-sensitive, leaving less room to maneuver amid domestic tightening.
Together, these internal and external challenges have created a perfect storm — one that tests not only China’s property sector but the very foundations of its investment-led growth model.
6. Spillovers: Why This Matters Beyond Real Estate
China’s property downturn isn’t just a housing market story — it’s a nationwide economic event with global reverberations. When a sector that once powered up to a third of GDP contracts sharply, the effects cascade across industries, households, and even international markets. The slowdown in 2025 is proving that real estate in China isn’t an isolated pillar — it’s the foundation upon which much of the economy rests.
6.1 GDP Drag & Growth Rebalancing
Real estate’s deep integration into China’s economy means its decline directly subtracts from GDP growth. When property investment falls, demand for construction materials, labor, and services plummets, creating a drag that ripples across sectors. In 2025, with real estate investment dropping 12.9% year-on-year, Beijing faces mounting pressure to find new growth engines.
To rebalance, policymakers are pivoting toward infrastructure spending, domestic consumption, and high-tech manufacturing. While these sectors show promise — especially in green energy, semiconductors, and electric vehicles — they cannot yet match the sheer scale of property’s past contribution. The challenge is clear: China must transition from a building-led to a productivity-driven economy, and that transformation takes time.
6.2 Financial Sector Stress & Non-Performing Loans
The financial system, deeply intertwined with real estate, is under strain. Banks have long extended credit to developers, construction firms, and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) that depend on land sales for repayment. As property values fall and developers default, non-performing loans (NPLs) are rising, particularly among smaller regional banks with heavy exposure.
This credit stress can create a contagion effect, reducing the overall appetite for lending and making it harder for viable businesses to access funding. The resulting credit squeeze further suppresses investment, amplifying the downturn. If not contained, these financial headwinds could morph into systemic risks — threatening not just growth, but financial stability.
6.3 Household Wealth, Consumption & Confidence
For most Chinese families, real estate is the primary store of wealth, accounting for over 70% of household assets. As property prices stagnate or fall, perceived wealth shrinks. This “negative wealth effect” makes households more cautious, reducing spending on consumer goods, travel, and services.
Falling home values also curb borrowing appetite, since property is often used as collateral. This feedback loop of lower confidence and weaker consumption risks slowing China’s long-planned shift toward a consumption-led economy. Even as the government pushes for retail and tech growth, household psychology — shaped by years of faith in ever-rising property values — is changing.
6.4 Commodity Demand & Global Linkages
China’s property and construction sectors are colossal consumers of global commodities such as steel, cement, copper, and iron ore. When construction slows, so does demand for these inputs, sending shockwaves across exporting nations like Australia, Brazil, and Indonesia.
A prolonged slump could push down global commodity prices, reshaping trade balances and hurting resource-dependent economies. For multinational suppliers and logistics chains, China’s reduced appetite means fewer exports, lower profits, and shifting trade routes — a vivid reminder that China’s slowdown is the world’s problem too.
6.5 Local Government & Social Stability Risks
Finally, the property slump threatens China’s local government finances. With land sales collapsing, local authorities are losing one of their primary revenue sources. This may force spending cuts, project delays, or higher local debt levels — all of which weigh on economic momentum.
In areas heavily reliant on property-related employment, rising layoffs could trigger social unrest or political tension. Maintaining social stability while restructuring the growth model will be one of Beijing’s toughest balancing acts in the coming years.
China’s real estate downturn is thus far more than a market correction — it’s a systemic adjustment touching finance, households, global trade, and governance. Managing these spillovers will define the next chapter of China’s economic story.
7. Policy Responses: What Beijing Has Tried & What’s Next
As China’s property downturn deepens in 2025, policymakers in Beijing have scrambled to stabilize the economy and restore confidence. Authorities have rolled out a wide array of monetary, fiscal, credit, and structural measures — but the impact remains uneven. While short-term liquidity support has slowed the pace of decline, the underlying weaknesses in demand, debt, and demographics persist. Understanding these responses provides insight into how China is attempting to recalibrate its growth model.
Monetary, Fiscal & Credit Tools
In September 2025, Beijing unveiled a 500 billion yuan (around USD 70 billion) policy-based financing package aimed at boosting investment and supporting struggling sectors. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has eased monetary policy by lowering reserve ratios for banks, guiding lending rates downward, and encouraging state-owned banks to extend credit to infrastructure and “healthy” property developers.
At the same time, infrastructure investment has become the go-to lever for stimulus. Local governments have been fast-tracking projects such as transport networks, renewable energy installations, and urban renewal schemes to absorb economic slack. However, these efforts face limits. With local debt already at record highs, concerns about debt accumulation, moral hazard, and crowding out of private investment have made authorities cautious about unleashing another massive credit binge.
Direct Support to Developers & Debt Restructuring
Recognizing the systemic risk from a cascade of developer defaults, Beijing has expanded refinancing facilities and relaxed parts of the “three red lines” policy that restricted excessive borrowing. Some “white-list” developers — financially sound firms deemed critical to completing stalled projects — now enjoy preferential access to loans and bond issuance.
At the same time, the government is facilitating debt restructuring for distressed developers, including negotiations with creditors and local governments to prevent disorderly bankruptcies. Still, the moral hazard dilemma remains: bailing out too many firms could perpetuate reckless borrowing and delay much-needed market discipline.
Demand Stimulus: Reviving Homebuyer Confidence
To reignite housing demand, several cities have introduced homebuyer incentives, such as lower down payment requirements, discounted mortgage rates, and direct subsidies. Pilot programs offering appliance trade-ins, consumer credit stimulus, and interest subsidies for personal loans are also underway to boost consumption.
However, results have been mixed. In wealthier urban centers, demand has shown tentative recovery, but in smaller or indebted regions, these measures have struggled to gain traction. With youth unemployment high and household sentiment weak, consumers remain cautious about taking on new mortgages.
Structural Reforms: Tackling the Roots of Instability
Beyond short-term stimulus, Beijing is pursuing structural reforms to reduce its overreliance on property and land-based revenues. A nationwide property tax is under consideration, aimed at creating a more sustainable fiscal foundation for local governments and curbing speculative investment.
Reforms to local government finance are also in motion — focusing on better matching revenue sources with expenditure obligations. Additionally, authorities are promoting greater transparency in developer escrow accounts, stronger protections for homebuyers, and legal mechanisms to handle unfinished housing projects.
The IMF has urged China to accelerate these efforts by eliminating rules that allow banks to hide bad loans, swiftly restructuring insolvent developers, and implementing insurance mechanisms for homebuyers facing project delays or non-completion risks.
Looking Ahead: Balancing Stability and Transformation
China’s 2025 policy mix reflects a delicate balancing act — stabilizing growth without reigniting excessive debt or speculation. While short-term support can cushion the downturn, only deeper structural reforms can rebuild confidence and set the stage for sustainable, innovation-led growth.
8. Scenario Outlook & Risks: What Could Happen Next
Several possible trajectories lie ahead:
| Scenario | Key Features | Probabilities / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| Gradual Stabilization | Property investment bottoms out by late 2026, aided by stimulus + market reforms | Requires credible policy, restored confidence, and gradual deleveraging |
| Prolonged Slump | Investment and property decline persist into 2027; weak rebound | High risk if sentiment remains depressed, capital markets frozen |
| Hard Landing | Banking stress triggers credit crunch, fiscal constraints bite, GDP growth falls below 3‑4% | Less likely, but possible under adverse external shock or policy misstep |
Key risk factors:
- Confidence gap: If homebuyers view stimulus as insufficient, market freeze could persist.
- Financial contagion: Banking sector stress could spill into credit crunch.
- Fiscal constraints: Local governments may run out of space to further support stimulus.
- External shock: A sudden global downturn or trade shock could undermine stimulus.
Analysts in a Reuters poll expect home prices to fall ~4.8% in 2025 and see investment decline ~8.4%, with a lackluster rebound in 2026.
9. Opinion & Insights: Lessons and Strategic Implications
China’s property downturn in 2025 marks a pivotal moment for both policymakers and investors. What began as a cyclical correction has evolved into a structural reckoning — exposing the vulnerabilities of an economy that leaned too heavily on property and construction for growth. From this unfolding crisis, several important lessons and strategic implications emerge for China and the global economy.
1. Overreliance on Property Was a Structural Flaw
For decades, real estate served as China’s default growth engine, driving investment, employment, and household wealth. Yet, this overreliance created systemic distortions — excessive local government debt, inflated asset prices, and speculative bubbles. The current slowdown underscores the need to diversify growth drivers, emphasizing innovation, technology, and sustainable consumption over debt-fueled building. Future resilience depends on rebalancing the economy toward productivity-driven expansion rather than asset appreciation.
2. Cautious Stimulus: Prudent but Potentially Insufficient
Beijing’s measured policy response — designed to avoid another debt spiral — reflects a shift toward long-term prudence. However, too little support, too late, risks deepening the downturn. As developers collapse and household confidence erodes, timid intervention could lead to a prolonged drag on growth. The challenge lies in striking the balance between preventing moral hazard and averting deflationary stagnation.
3. Rebuilding Fragile Market Confidence
Confidence — both domestic and international — is now China’s most critical asset. Policymakers must clearly signal that losses will not spiral unchecked and that investor and homebuyer protections are in place. Transparent communication, credible reform roadmaps, and fair treatment of private enterprises are essential to restore trust in China’s markets. Without it, even well-crafted stimulus measures may fail to gain traction.
4. The New Winners: Beyond Real Estate
As capital flees the property sector, new growth frontiers are emerging. Sectors like renewable energy, electric vehicles, advanced manufacturing, and digital services are likely to attract redirected investment. For investors, the long-term opportunity lies in China’s transition to a tech- and sustainability-led economy.
5. Lessons for Other Economies
For India and other emerging markets, China’s crisis offers a cautionary tale: avoid speculative housing booms, ensure prudent credit allocation, and maintain fiscal buffers to manage downturns. Economic growth must rest on productivity and diversification — not on perpetual asset inflation.
10. Conclusion: Toward Stabilization or Deeper Slump?
China's property slump is more than a sectoral downturn — it’s a structural test of its growth model. The 2025 data — 0.5% FAI growth overall, and –12.9% in property — underscores just how central real estate has been to China’s economic engine. The challenges are deep: developer debt, weak demand, fiscal constraints, and global headwinds.
While policy makers are acting — fiscal injection, credit easing, direct support — the path forward is uncertain. The balance lies in stabilizing the system without encouraging moral hazard, reorienting growth toward productive investments, and rebuilding confidence.
If Beijing can manage the transition — hard as it is — China may emerge leaner, more sustainable, and less vulnerable to property cycles. If missteps or crises cascade, the broader economic impact could be severe. For global markets, the reverberations already appear in commodity demand, supply chains, and investor sentiment.
In the months and years ahead, observing China’s policy calibration, credit flows, and real estate market signals will be critical to gauging whether the slump is nearing its bottom—or descending further.
11. FAQ
Q1: Is this slump entirely surprising?
A: Not entirely. Analysts had flagged overcapacity, rising developer debt, demographic headwinds, and policy tightening for years. The depth and persistence, however, may still exceed many expectations.
Q2: Could China just reflate the property bubble again?
A: It’s unlikely that Beijing will fully revert to unrestrained property-driven stimulus, given the risk of debt, speculative bubbles, and systemic instability. The goal is more likely to manage a controlled adjustment.
Q3: How will this affect China’s GDP growth in 2025–2026?
A: Real estate contraction could shave off 1–2 percentage points of GDP growth. To maintain its 5% target, China must lean harder on infrastructure, industrial, and consumption sectors.
Q4: What sectors might benefit?
A: Infrastructure, renewable energy, technology, advanced manufacturing, and service sectors less tied to property may attract relative capital inflows as risk in real estate rises.
Q5: Should global investors be alarmed?
A: Yes, particularly if commodity prices fall, credit markets tighten, or China’s growth slows materially. But many large economies are less directly exposed to Chinese real estate — the key lies in sector and country-specific linkages.
12. References & Further Reading
Below is a curated list of the credible sources and further reading relevant to this topic:
- National Bureau of Statistics of China — Investment in Fixed Assets in the First Half of 2025 (stats.gov.cn)
- China.org.cn / Xinhua — China’s fixed-asset investment up 4.2 pct in Q1
- Reuters — “China property investment falls 9.9% y/y in January‑March 2025”
- Reuters / news coverage — “China unveils 70 billion financing tools …”
- Reuters — “Analysts downgrade China’s property price outlook in 2025”
- IMF — China’s Real Estate Sector: Managing the Medium‑Term Slowdown (chart projection)
- Statista — Chart: China’s Property Investment Drops 12%
- Statista — Chart: Losses of Chinese Property Developers (Evergrande, Country Garden)
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